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TAX POLICY REFORM

Maine’s Dubious Odyssey into the
Funding of Local Government
by Peter Mills
Despite recent reforms to Maine’s school funding formula (as were enacted by the
legislature in the last session), State Senator Peter Mills argues that the formula will
not be truly “fixed” until we address the municipal side of property tax inequities.
To that end, he prescribes some tough medicine for Maine policymakers to relieve
the disproportionate tax burden on Maine’s service center communities. Among
other things, he suggests we consider repealing some of the exemptions that exclude
a quarter of all property from taxation, permitting service centers to adopt local
option taxes, and injecting the state’s limited revenue sharing funds into just those
municipalities with intolerable tax burdens that remain unmanageable through
local resources.

-

Moreover, Mills asserts that the state “cannot relieve inequity

by trying to carpet bomb the property tax.” He calls for an end to expensive
and unfocused measures that sprinkle the state’s revenue too broadly. With income
tax rates among the highest in the nation (and a sales tax soon to be reduced), Mills
argues that our failure to address property tax inequities squanders the state’s
limited resources and places the state’s future economic competitiveness in jeopardy.
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INTRODUCTION

ne hundred years ago, Maine and its subdivisions depended
almost entirely on the property tax to fund government at all
levels. Towns as collecting agents were directed to add several mills
to local tax bills and remit the proceeds to Augusta to support
functions of the state.
Today, the flow is reversed. In 1952, the legislature passed a
sales tax, and in 1969 an income tax. Although initially adopted
for the state’s self-support, about half of these revenues are now
remitted to local governments to relieve the property tax. In many
local budgets, state-supplied revenue overshadows the significance
of the property tax itself.
Money from the state is delivered to towns and school districts
or given back directly to property taxpayers under a variety of
different schemes. The dominant system is General Purpose Aid to
Education, a matrix of funding relationships defined by a formula
that sometimes breaks down under pressure to solve municipal
issues unrelated to teaching children.
When all of the state’s revenue sharing and rebate systems are
identified, quantified and held up to light, it is difficult to conclude
that there is any general or unifying theme that can pass muster as
consistent policy. In reviewing and critiquing these systems, this
article makes the case that raw necessity and simple equity ought to
be the guiding principles for justifying state expenditures on local
government. To go beyond merely squanders revenue and elevates
state taxes in a way that threatens the competitiveness of Maine’s
economy in the national marketplace.

O

SCHOOL FUNDING, REVENUE SHARING AND REBATES

tate relief for the property tax is delivered in four primary ways:
General Purpose Aid; municipal revenue sharing; road
assistance; and an assortment of rebate payments to taxpayers.
School subsidies consume every third dollar of state taxes. In
Fiscal Year 2000 the state will spend for the benefit of K-12
schools a total of $778 million out of a state budget of $2.4
billion. No other department of state government claims a greater
share of the general fund.
It requires $1.6 billion a year to run Maine’s 726 public
schools through 286 local governing units. Five percent is from
federal funds; the remainder comes about equally from state and
local sources. The state share is largely from sales and income taxes,

S

the local share from property taxes. School funding is, by far, the
state’s largest property tax relief program for municipalities.
The second largest is general revenue sharing which distributes
$92 million per year to towns, about one-eighth of what is
provided through school funding. The state treasurer is directed by
law to siphon off 5.1% from all sales and income taxes directly into
a municipal revenue sharing pool and remit only the remaining
94.9% to the general fund. The municipal pool is then distributed
each month to all 494 Maine communities and the Unorganized
Territories under a formula with two variables: population and local
property tax rate (adjusted to state equalized valuations).
If two communities have the same population but the adjusted
local tax rate is twenty mills in one town and only ten mills in the
other, then the town with twenty mills receives twice as much
money from the pool. While this is a gesture toward equity, it needs
to be emphasized that every town receives a substantial subsidy,
even those whose property wealth justifies no need for assistance.
The third largest program is state road assistance, which will
supply $22 million to local government in Fiscal Year 2000. The
Department of Transportation (DOT) distributes money based
on the number of winter and summer roads in need of
maintenance. In recent years the DOT has directed that some of
the money be devoted to capital improvement programs rather
than routine upkeep.
Other programs distribute money as direct relief for property
owners while permitting the towns to collect all or most of the tax.
These include a rapidly growing Business Equipment Tax
Reimbursement program (costing $42 million this year and more
than $50 million next), a circuit breaker refund for low-income
homeowners and renters (costing $26 million), a new state-funded
homestead exemption for the first $7,000 of value in a residence
(costing $43 million), and a tree growth program to shelter
woodlands from development (costing $5.5 million).
LOCAL DEPENDENCE ON THE PROPERTY TAX

n total revenue, towns collect or receive roughly $1.5 billion (not
including school funding). Their major sources are $1.2 billion
from property taxes, $130 million from vehicle excise taxes, $92
million from revenue sharing, and $22 million from DOT road
assistance. Towns provide $775 million to local schools, contribute
$60 million to county government, and spend about $700 million
on their own municipal services.

I
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So long as education is controlled locally, the first layer of
support for public schools will come from the property tax; that is
how towns raise money. Although they have other small sources of
revenue, the property tax is the only tax which local governments
control. Maine does not permit its towns to tax sales or income.
Maine has $70 billion dollars worth of taxable property. Tax
rates in populated regions range from seven or eight mills in rich
coastal towns and some rural plantations to 27.3 mills in Lewiston.
The state average is 17.34 mills (1.734% of value), yielding $1.2
billion dollars annually from property taxes.
For other sources of revenue, towns have no power to set rates
and thus no control over what they earn. The vehicle excise tax, for
instance, is the second largest supply of money for municipal
government. It produces $130 million, or about 10% of locally
raised funds. The rate for this tax is set by law (at 24 mills for new
cars) so that the amount paid on any vehicle is the same wherever
the tax is collected. The effect of the tax varies widely. In rural
Jackman, 21% of local tax receipts are based on trucks and cars;
whereas in Jay, which has a paper mill to tax but fewer logging
trucks, only 4% comes from vehicles.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY WEALTH

he most important thing to know about the value of real estate
is the unevenness of its distribution. Only 40% of the state’s
taxable property is residential. The remaining 60% is industrial,
commercial and recreational property that is distributed randomly
from town to town. Some towns have so much of it that 90% of
their taxes are paid by people and companies who don’t live there.
By contrast, many other towns collect nearly all of their revenue
from local homes because there is nothing else to tax—no paper mill,
no lakefronts, and no impressive coast lines. When it comes to
supporting children in school, the difference in capacity from the top
of the scale to the low end is staggering. Many towns have ten times
as much property per pupil as others do. These differences occur
through accidents of geography with no one to blame.
One of the most revealing documents regularly produced by
state government is a listing by the Department of Education of all
286 school units ranked in sequence to show the amount of
property valuation behind each pupil. The differences are dramatic.
While it demonstrates in part the existence of “two Maines,” not all
poor districts are in the north, nor all rich in the south. Among the
poorest are Berwick and Sanford. Among the wealthiest are
Carrabasset Valley and Rangeley.

T
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Many wealthy towns, notably those on the coast, have more
than a million dollars in property value to support each child in
school. To raise $5,000 for a child’s education in Southport
(valuation $2.4 million per child) would require a tax rate of just
over two mills. (In fact, they raise 3.73 mills.) In the less fortunate
Aroostook town of Woodland, it would take sixty mills to raise
$5,000 and over ninety-one mills to raise the $7,821 that is
actually spent by Southport.
Wealth is not confined to the coast. The entire northern forest,
consisting of 10.5 million acres in the Unorganized Territory,
supports only 1,300 children in school. The tax for education is
five mills. Thus, 50% of the land mass of the state is taxed at only
five mills for education while the other half averages 11.07. The
education tax in the Unorganized Territory is about fifty cents per
acre for raw land. Although the Territory is administered by the
state as though it were a gigantic municipality, it is not treated as
one of Maine’s 286 school units and therefore does not participate
in General Purpose Aid. Attractive tax rates in the Unorganized
Territory have tempted small towns like Madrid to deorganize and
turn themselves over to the state and the county for further
governance, giving up local control for favorable taxes.
If it were not for state school subsidies, our poorer towns
would be bankrupted by the burden of education. Woodland, near
Caribou, with 305 children to educate has only $83,000 in
property value behind each child. It receives about $1.1 million in
state aid to supplement the $325,000 it is able to raise locally by
taxing itself at nearly thirteen mills. Even with high taxes and a
large subsidy, it is able to spend only $4,070 per child, $1,100 less
than the state average. If Woodland were on its own without
subsidy, and if it elected to tax itself at sixty-two mills in order to
raise the state’s average expenditure of $5,150 per child, it would,
in theory, take only sixteen years to confiscate all the property in
town to educate children. There are many children living in towns
with less than $150,000 in valuation per child:
Glenburn
Van Buren
Greenbush
Mars Hill
Mechanic Falls
Medway
Princeton

739 students
532 students
338 students
463 students
556 students
352 students
199 students
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. . . not all poor districts are in the north, nor all rich in the south.
Among the poorest are Berwick and Sanford.
Among the wealthiest are Carrabasset Valley and Rangeley.
If there were no state subsidy, each of these towns would
require a tax of thirty-four mills just to raise the state average
expenditure of $5,150 per student. While property tax rates in
Maine peak out at twenty-seven mills (in state-equalized rates),
in New Hampshire there are towns whose rates rise to forty or
fifty mills precisely because the state provides no school funding
subsidy. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has declared such
excessive reliance on local funding to be unconstitutional, as
have other states.
In Maine many school districts link rich towns with poor
towns. These combinations are encouraged by the school funding
subsidy, which is calculated on the basis of what the district is
entitled to as a whole. A wealthy town standing alone might receive
very little subsidy, but when it joins with a poorer neighbor, the
new district benefits not only from economies of scale but also
from a subsidy based on blended wealth.
Unfortunately, when the valuation differences are extreme, it
is advantageous for the wealthy neighbor to remain aloof rather
than to subject its tax base to the district’s burden. Carrabassett
Valley, Rangeley Plantation and West Forks, for instance, find it
preferable to pay tuition on the order of $6,000 per student rather
than to tax themselves at three times that rate by joining a
neighboring district. To join the district would cost an additional
$12,000 per child; but in such wealthy towns this would require
only three or four mills of added tax.
THE SERVICE CENTER PROBLEM

hile there are great differences among towns in their
capacities to raise revenue, there are equally significant
variations in demands for municipal services. In some rural
towns with dirt roads, no police force and a volunteer fire
department, it is possible to pay for nearly all services entirely
from miscellaneous revenue (vehicle excise taxes, state revenue
sharing and road assistance), without relying on the property
tax at all (in such towns it is primarily for schools that a tax
bill is issued).

W

By contrast, in more centralized towns and cities, often called
“service center communities,” the tax for municipal services may
equal or exceed the bill for schools. These are towns where people
visit shopping centers, receive medical care, borrow from banks,
take college courses, shop for cars and appliances, go to court, buy
insurance, file deeds, and seek legal advice. Many of these towns
are county seats. They have full-time fire fighters, a round-the-clock
police force, a public library, professional street crews and a
management staff at city hall
Service center communities are not necessarily large and
metropolitan; many are small but functionally set apart. Most have
other towns around them with populations dependent on services
from the center. Property tax rates in the central communities are
often more than double what they are in the surrounding towns.
Smaller centers like Houlton, Mars Hill, Eastport and Mexico, for
example, all have property tax rates in excess of twenty-four mills,
just as do the larger centers of Portland, Lewiston, and Auburn.
In such communities we find concentrations of tax-exempt
property for which services are provided without compensating
taxes to pay for them. In the aggregate, about 15% of Maine
property is tax-exempt ($11 billion out of $81 billion). While over
half of the exemptions are for government (U.S., state and
municipal), exempt properties also include colleges, churches,
fraternal halls, hospitals and medical facilities. Twenty-seven
percent of Lewiston is tax exempt, 40% of Brunswick, 49% of
Orono, 21% of both Portland and Waterville, 24% of Presque Isle,
25% of Machias, and 22% of Calais.
In stark contrast are the satellite towns where exempt property
is negligible, often just a small church, a town office and a few
graveyards. The tax base for many small and peripheral Maine
towns includes 99% of all the property within their borders.
While it is true that residents of service center communities
directly benefit from the value of the added services provided to
them (trash pick up, concerts at city hall, prompt response for heart
attacks, etc.), the doubling of their tax burden undoubtedly exceeds
the value of whatever they receive in return. Why else would so
many of their residents be escaping to the suburbs?
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To support schools, towns throughout the state impose an
average property tax of 11.07 mills. Under the influence of the
school funding formula, the rate of tax for schools does not vary
greatly from this norm except in the wealthiest communities that
can pay for education at rates of only a few mills. Among the large
majority of towns closer to the median, a school unit is regarded as
making a poor effort if it assesses only nine mills; at thirteen mills,
its residents are said to be making a large sacrifice for education.
On the municipal side, by contrast, rates vary from zero mills
to fourteen, depending on many variables: the cost of services
required to run the town; the amount of exempt property; the
presence of industrial or recreational property to inflate the tax
base; and the revenue available from other sources, notably the
vehicle excise tax, road assistance and revenue sharing.
As the above description highlights, there are property tax
inequities of all sorts that come to bear on school funding. Many
of them, such as service center issues, are not solvable through the
formula; but service center towns, with their demographic power,
think nothing of making demands on the school funding formula
to solve their unrelated problems.
While the legislature’s Taxation Committee reviews property
tax issues year after year, it remains politically stymied to address
them competently. This failure increases pressure on the Education
Committee, where the school funding formula becomes the focus
of perpetual adjustment amid futile and misguided efforts to fill
tax policy voids.

To begin with, General Purpose Aid is really four subformulas
blended into one another using algorithms that are fathomable by
very few human beings, and which are calculable only by
computers operated by management information specialists. It is
no wonder that so many legislators confine their analysis to a quick
glance at spreadsheets defining their hometown entitlements.
To understand public school aid, it is important to put the four
formula components into scale and then complete the picture by
including teacher retirement costs the state pays directly and
outside the formula. Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2000 are:
Category
1. Operating costs
2. Program costs
3. Debt service subsidy
4.Adjustments (direct costs)
Sub-total
Add a hold-harmless provision
Total General Purpose Aid

Amount
$325.89 million
$208.55 million
$56.15 million
$30.10 million
$620.69 million
$3.78 million
$624.47 million

Percentage
52.5%
33.6%
9.0%
4.9%
100.0%

Add:
Teacher pension costs
$150.00 million
Retired teacher health insurance
$3.46 million
Total support for K-12
from state funds
$777.93 million
COMPONENTS OF K-12 FUNDING

THE K-12 FORMULA IN OVERVIEW

he education funding formula is the state’s most significant
effort to bring equity to the funding of local government.
At its core the formula is driven by two variables among school
units: the number of students and property valuation. If the
formula were left at that—if the state’s money were distributed
simply in proportion to valuation per pupil—we might then be
spared the annual spreadsheet battles and the agony of
benighted debate that pass for public service on the Education
Committee. While such a formula might not be entirely fair, it
would at least be comprehensible—and that, in the long run, is
just as important.
Unfortunately, the formula is not simple. It has dozens of
refinements, wrinkles and modifications that make it difficult
to grasp and that often hinder equity even though justified in
equity’s name.

T
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he components of the formula and the teacher retirement
appropriation may be outlined as follows:

T

Operating costs
Operating costs are the normal and generic expenses
encountered by every school district, including the salaries for
regular teachers, the cost of maintaining buildings and paying
utilities. This is the category regarded as the essence of General
Purpose Aid, yet it accounts for only 52% of General Purpose Aid
and is the last of the four elements to receive an increment when
money is added to the formula. The other three components are
funded first while operating costs are adjusted last to absorb what
remains of the total appropriation.
This category is based on the premise that every district should
spend at least $4,020 per child—this year’s “per-pupil
guarantee”—on normal operating costs. The per-pupil guarantee
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. . . there are property tax inequities of all sorts that come to bear
on school funding. Many of them, such as service center issues,
are not solvable through the formula . . .
is raised through a combination of state and local funds with
every school unit required to generate a local share. To the extent
that a school unit’s required share falls short of $4,020, the state
pays the difference as the operating cost subsidy.
Amounts raised by the district in excess of its local share are
optional and do not diminish the state’s contribution. However, if
the district fails to raise its local share, it loses $1 of subsidy for
each dollar of shortfall.
The local share for each district is based on two weighted
factors: 85% on its property tax capacity and 15% on its median
household income. The taxing capacity of each school unit is
measured by property valuation per student. Municipal property
assessments are adjusted to 100% of market value for uniformity
throughout the state.
Each district’s local share is determined by reference to a mill
rate known as the “statewide local share.” Set this year at 6.67 mills,
this figure is used to calculate what all districts must raise on a
statewide basis to arrive at the aggregate local share of operating
costs. Because of formula intricacies having to do with minimum
subsidy calculations, 6.67 is not equivalent to the mill rate required
to produce the local share of any single district. The actual mill rate
for most districts is above seven.
The statewide local share and the per-pupil guarantee are the
two major determinants of equity under the current formula.
When appropriated funds are held constant, raising either of
these variables shifts money from rich districts to poor. Under
provisions passed in 1999, a schedule was set for raising both
variables for Fiscal Year 2000 and for each of the three years that
follow, not with the intent of reducing what any wealthy district
presently receives, but with the hope of distributing newly
appropriated money in a way that will increase equity to poor
districts as time goes on.
If a district has sufficient property wealth (approximately
$700,000 in valuation per child) so that its local share calculation
raises more than the per-pupil guarantee, then the district is given
a minimum subsidy, roughly equivalent to 5% of average costs.
Forty-five of the 286 districts are wealthy enough to receive only

the minimum. The aggregate cost of minimum subsidies is just
under $1 million, which is regarded by most observers as a suitable
price for requiring these districts to supply the data necessary to
manage the system. However, one might ask why the state must
also pay their teachers’ pensions.
The formula is further modified by injecting a 15% weighted
factor for relative household income that adjusts the amount
calculated under the tax capacity analysis. In the end, this
controversial modifier significantly dilutes equity in the formula.
Rich districts receive more and poor districts less.
An extreme example makes the point. If a hypothetical
school unit had zero taxing capacity (a total absence of taxable
property), then it would need a state subsidy for the full $4,020
of the per-pupil guarantee because it would have no other
source of revenue. However, if the district has an average
household income rating, then its subsidy is reduced by 15% to
only $3,417, even though the town can raise no money of its
own. It can only tax property, not income; in this simple
example, it has no property to tax.

Program costs
Program costs are special expenses that vary significantly
from one district to another. For that reason, they are subsidized
separately on the basis of each unit’s actual costs as reported
from two years before. Representing about one-third of General
Purpose Aid, they include:
a. Early childhood programs
b. Special education (local)
c. Special education (tuition & board)
d. Transport operations
e. Vocational education
f. Approved bus purchases
The state subsidizes program costs in two modes (depending
on whether the costs fall above or below a threshold that is
calculated by applying a circuit breaker mill rate to the district’s
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Resist the temptation to hold all districts harmless at every
turn in the road. If a school unit is losing pupils and gaining valuation,
then it must sacrifice subsidy.
taxable real estate). The mill rate is 1.21 for Fiscal Year 2000. The
bottom layer of costs, those below the threshold, are subsidized
based on a percentage calculated by analyzing historical operating
costs. The calculation of this percentage (which is zero for wealthy
districts) preserves a portion of a former foundation cost system
that was otherwise repealed in 1995.
Above the circuit breaker threshold, the state subsidizes 100%
of program costs without any limit on the subsidy, even if the
district is wealthy. Because program costs are “expenditure driven,”
most districts have an incentive to allocate costs into this category
whenever discretion or accounting flexibility permits.
When there is not enough money appropriated to pay for
100% of the state’s program subsidy, the state reduces—by a fixed
percentage—the total amount payable to each district. Because
poor districts lack the taxing capacity to recover the lost revenue,
this “percentage reduction” method of balancing the program
account is significantly detrimental to them.
As new funds were added to the formula for Fiscal Year 2000,
the percentage reduction factor was dropped from 21% to 15.88%,
which is a significant step toward equity for poor districts. Still, it
also benefitted some wealthier districts with high program costs
because they, too, will receive larger subsidies. Districts favored by
the change include both metropolitan centers with high special
education costs and rural schools with high transportation expenses.

Debt Service
Debt service includes costs for approved capital projects and
certain leases. They represent about 9% of General Purpose Aid.
The state subsidizes debt service in a way that is parallel to
program costs, with the exception that debt service subsidies are
given only for projects that are approved by the state under a
weighted priority system.
As with program costs, a qualifying district receives a more
substantial subsidy for debt service costs above a circuit breaker
threshold (.5 mills for Fiscal Year 2000). With new regional high
schools costing upward of $25 million, it is becoming increasingly
common for wealthier school units to penetrate the threshold when
they qualify for new construction projects.
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Adjustments
“Adjustments” are direct costs paid by the state to the extent of
the available appropriation. This category, representing about 5% of
General Purpose Aid, includes the cost of educating state wards,
state agency clients and pupils in out-of-district placements. Some
of these costs are passed through from other departments, such as
Human Services or Corrections.
Among the adjustments, the expense for out-of-district
placements is perennially controversial. For each out-of-district
placement of a special education student, the state distributes to the
district funds to pay for a portion of that year’s costs, which exceed
three times the normal cost for educating the pupil; it does this each
spring. Because the appropriation is always less than what is
needed, the district must account for the shortfall under its program
costs, a portion of which is subsidized two years later under the
program section of the formula.
Teacher Retirement Costs
Completely outside the General Purpose Aid formula, the state
pays 100% of the employer’s share for teacher pensions plus 30%
of health insurance costs for retired teachers. These retirement
payments are significantly more beneficial to wealthy districts than
to poor because pension contributions are directly proportional to
teacher pay, which is much higher in wealthy districts.
When this subsidy is added to the funds appropriated for
General Purpose Aid, teacher retirement costs comprise more
than one-fifth of the total amount provided by the state for
K-12 education. In effect, 20% of the state’s K-12 subsidy
system counteracts the tax-equity purposes which underlie the
remaining 80%.
TO FIX THE EDUCATION FUNDING FORMULA

veryone familiar with the school funding formula keeps a list of
things to change. I recommend the following:

E

1. If the four categories of General Purpose Aid are
preserved—as probably they should be—then detach
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them from each other and appropriate funds to each
separately under simple formulas that are kept as
parallel as possible. This way policymakers can see
clearly how funds are being spent.
2. For program and debt service costs, allow the circuit
breaker thresholds to float upward so that only those
districts with the greatest need will qualify for full
reimbursement. Subsidies below the threshold levels
should be based on the same percentages as for
operating costs.
3. Reduce—but do not eliminate—the percentage
reduction factor for program and debt service costs.
While the current 15.88% discount is too high, a
continuing contribution from local funds is appropriate
in order to discourage districts from dumping costs
into these favored categories. Such costs will be better
controlled if the district puts some of its own money
toward them at every level of the reimbursement scale.
4. Substitute a straight “local share mill rate” for the very
complex “statewide local share” calculation.
Continuing to elevate this minimum mill rate may be
necessary to ensure that locally raised funds are
suitably matched to the state’s own contribution.
5. Follow through on commitments to raise the perpupil guarantee to suitable levels as appropriations are
raised in future years.
6. Resist the temptation to hold all districts harmless at
every turn in the road. If a school unit is losing pupils
and gaining valuation, then it must sacrifice subsidy.
While losses may be dampened or cushioned, they
should not be indefinitely postponed.
7. Strike the income factor from the operating cost
formula to eliminate its dilution of property tax equity.
8. Put the normal cost component of the teacher
retirement contribution (6% of salary) onto district
payrolls so it will be accounted for under the formula.
The unfunded liability component (about 12% of
payroll) should be paid by the state.
9. Require that property in wealthy districts be taxed at a
minimum mill rate for education. While we must

respect that Maine’s attempt at a uniform property tax
for education was repealed by popular vote in 1976,
we can still recognize how absurd it is that so many
major property holdings in Maine are being taxed at
five mills or less while the average is 11.07.
Above all else, the formula must be made simple. Equity and
simplicity are not at cross purposes. It is entirely feasible to produce
a formula that preserves the beneficial essence of the present system
while excoriating the layers of algorithms we have allowed to
accumulate under layers of change.
Complexity works to the advantage of insiders by destroying
the capacity of citizens and legislators to comprehend policy. What
people cannot understand, they are compelled to ignore. We have
enough experts on night hunting and lobster trap vents. We need
more who understand how one-third of the budget is spent. We
will have such people as soon as the formula is rewritten in plain
terms with its principles suitably distilled.
TOWARD A “GRAND UNIFIED THEORY”

e must recognize that the school funding formula is only a
limited measure for property tax relief. Even though the state
provides half the funding for public education, the management of
schools remains a fiercely protected local prerogative. The
Department of Education does not manage school systems. Thus,
even though it seems strange to say so, state school funding is more
about taxes than education.
Still, the formula is a limited instrument of tax policy. It
cannot resolve, nor even competently address, the municipal side
of property tax inequities. If the state continues with its “eyes
wide shut” to the burdens of our service center communities,
then we can hardly blame them for flexing their considerable
power to distort the formula in ways that will benefit them to the
detriment of more needy districts. Maine needs a “Grand Unified
Theory” to pull together its disparate policies toward funding
local government.
Service center communities do have genuine and significant
problems that the state has not addressed. They also have
demographic strength and political power. However, when these
districts must choose between tackling tax exempt institutions or
teasing out concessions from the school funding formula, their
political energy is channeled to the formula. We must address the
problems of service center communities, not only because they

W
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deserve it, but also because we must prevent them from dipping
into school funds at the expense of children in poor districts.
There is no easy way out of this. We have to approach
municipal tax problems like adults and tell people some bad
news. There will be losers. Someone new may have to be
taxed. Some subsidies will be reduced. We cannot solve
property tax inequities by indiscriminately broadcasting state
revenue to all communities at once. There are some difficult
changes we can embrace:
• In our service center communities, we can repeal some
of the exemptions that exclude a quarter of all
property from taxation. Perhaps we should deny
exemptions for some and impose fees on others, at
least for the value of the services they receive—as
represented by the non-educational component of the
community tax bill.
• We can permit service centers to adopt local option
taxes to relieve their property tax dependency. We can
free these communities to exploit their own
commercial strengths by giving them flexibility to
design tax systems for themselves.
• The state can inject its limited revenue sharing funds
into just those municipalities with intolerable tax
burdens that remain unmanageable through local
resources. Since the education side is already subsidized,
perhaps revenue sharing should be distributed only
in proportion to the non-education mill rate. In any
case, we should stop squandering state funds on
wealthy towns with total mill rates under twelve.
In recent years we have adopted a number of expensive, broad
and unfocused measures; they share the single virtue of being
politically inoffensive. We seem unable to bear the thought of
taxing anyone new. It is easier simply to sprinkle money in all
directions at once as though we were blessed with an inexhaustible
supply. Consider the following examples:
• As mentioned above, municipal revenue sharing—
although proportional to local tax rates—is
nevertheless delivered to all Maine communities, rich
and poor alike.
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• Under the Business Equipment Tax Reimbursement
(BETR) program, state funds are sent to all eligible
businesses in all communities without addressing the
issue of need or return on investment. Much of the
money is simply doled out to shareholders of the
world’s largest corporations.
• Maine’s homestead exemption (passed in 1998)
is delivered to all Maine homeowners without
regard to whether relief is needed. Large portions
of the refund are lost to the federal government
through reduction of itemized deductions on
the homeowner’s tax return. Thousands of
well-off people receive insubstantial benefits
at great aggregate cost to the state.
• Road assistance money from the Department of
Transportation is distributed to towns on the basis
of certain highway categories. Much of the money
is received by towns with very low mill rates. The
program has little to do with need and nothing to
do with adjusting relative tax burdens.
We cannot relieve inequity by trying to carpet bomb the
property tax. The state’s revenue arsenal is not up to the task. The
state is already recycling half its tax receipts back to local
governments. Further, under pressure from municipalities to relieve
the property tax and under lobbying from business to sustain the
expanding BETR program, the percentage of recycled revenue is
growing every year under pleas from educators to expand school
funding.
We have superior laser-guided ordnance available. Our best
example is the circuit breaker program for low-income renters and
homeowners, which annually distributes a small fund of state
money in direct proportion to each recipient’s tax burden and need.
It is the lowest cost of all our programs and the one that provides
the greatest good on the ground.
With Maine’s sales tax soon to be reduced to a moderate 5%,
we are becoming more reliant than ever on the income tax to
sustain state government. While many states have dropped income
tax rates in response to recent upswings in the economy, our rates
remain among the highest in the nation. States do not enjoy the
same freedom to tax income as the United States government has.

TAX POLICY REFORM

. . . the formula is a limited instrument of tax policy.
It cannot resolve, nor even competently address, the municipal side
of property tax inequities.
Few people abandon American citizenship when the federal income
tax is raised by a few percentage points.
Among the states, by contrast, citizens may flow at will. The
problem of rate competition is acute. An elevated income tax
drives out highly paid management personnel, entrepreneurs, and
wealthy retirees and dries up venture capital from all sources,
including non-residents.
When we lose managers and investors, we lose the wages, the
spending and the taxes that their money can leverage. When we
lose retirees, we lose not only their income taxes while they live, but
also their estate taxes when they die. High income tax rates produce
a brutally compound impact on the state’s economy and the general
revenues to the state itself.
Some will point out that property taxes can have a similar
impact, but who can seriously argue against equity in taxation? If
the owner of a ski condo or a salt water cottage is taxed at only
seven mills, will an increase to twelve mills make such a
difference? Will the Elks close down if the assessor sends a tax
bill to the lodge?
It is not my purpose to argue that aggregate state subsidies
to local government are too high. It is merely to point out that
our systems of distribution are defective. With the state spending
over a billion dollars a year to achieve property tax equity, we
have a right to expect better results. A town should not be
required to tax itself in excess of twelve mills to achieve only a
substandard school system. A service center community should
not have to collect twelve mills and more just to provide required
services to its residents. These communities and their taxpayers
deserve better treatment.
Property owners in our service center communities are
consistently taxed at twenty-four mills or more, while owners of
coastal and forested property are taxed at only seven or eight mills.
Yet a large portion of the state subsidy money continues to flow
into towns with low to moderate mill rates or directly to taxpayers
in such communities.

For far too long, Maine has been a prodigal partner to its local
governments. The state has been inexcusably careless in defining its
relationships with municipalities, school units and those who pay
property taxes. Maine’s revenue sharing programs squander the
state’s own limited resources to poor effect. Much of the money for
local schools is distributed without sufficient regard for meeting
needs or relieving the highest burdens. And all the while, we avoid
politically difficult reforms that would build capacity for service
center communities to stand on their own. The state cannot
continue to raise revenue for local government without tailoring our
programs to do exactly what is needed to achieve equity—and
precious little more. Peter Mills is a trial lawyer from
Skowhegan and represents Somerset
County in the Maine Senate. He sits
on the Taxation and Labor committees.
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